The Back Channel: Book Review

The Back Channel: A Memoir of American Diplomacy and the Case for Its Renewal, 2019, William J. Burns. Burns spent 33 years in the State Department rising to the rank of Deputy Secretary of State, a rare honor for a carrier employee, before he retired in 2014. As an afterward he railed against the travesty of Donald Trump to the State Department during his first term. Probably unexpectantly, Burns became the Director of the CIA under Joe Biden for four additional years. There were ups and downs, including the militant years of George W. Bush, and the diplomatically successful years of the first George Bush and Barack Obama.

Prologue: He starts in 1991, when he considered diplomacy at its peak under James Baker. “The liberal order that the US had built and led after WWII would soon draw into its embrace the former Soviet empire. … Russia was flat on its back, China was still turned inward, and the US and its key European and Asian allies faced few regional threats and even fewer economic rivals” (p. 3). Then Clinton replace Bush and Burns had to draft a welcoming letter (“the paradox of American statecraft”). Ideological uniformity was not happening.

A quarter century later, Trump was elected, while England quit the European Market (Brexit), a popular unease that a globalized economy was not worth the benefits. “Gridlock is the default position in Washington and bipartisan compromise a distant memory. … Long before Trump’s election my diplomatic apprenticeship exposed me to the best—and worst—of American statecraft and its practitioners” (p. 7). Burns was ambassador in Putin’s Russia.

“Short of war, diplomacy is the main instrument we employ to manage foreign relations, reduce external risks, and exploit opportunities to advance our security and prosperity. … it is an unheroic, quiet endeavor. … Its successes are rarely celebrated, its failures almost always scrutinized. Henry Kissinger has called diplomacy ‘the patient accumulation of partial successes. … A diplomat serves many roles: a translator of the world to Washington and Washington to the world; an early-warning radar for troubles and opportunities, … and executor of policy” (p. 9). Diplomacy helps American businesses abroad and manage visas. Non-state actors from the Gates Foundation to al-Qaeda, as well as cyberspace have additional challenges. Diplomacy as managing problems rather than solving them.

Chapter1: Apprenticeship: The Education of a Diplomat. On his first job he lost a truck: “my first lesson in professional humility” (p. 16). Burns won a scholarship after college to Oxford University and received a Ph.D. in international relations. In 1979 he took the Foreign Service exam and later started his Foreign Service orientation, when there were 5,500 officers staffing 230 embassies and consulates. He met and married his wife, a fellow diplomat. He started by learning Arabic and serving in Amman, Jordan when King Hussein ruled. Jordan was difficult with limited resources and economic opportunity, plus lots of resentful Palestinians. There was a Lebanese civil war, the continuing Israeli-Palestinian dispute, and Iran-Iraq conflict.

Burns returned to Washington in 1986 in the National Security Office’s Near East and South Asia directorate: Morocco to Bangladesh.

Chapter 2: The Baker Years: Shaping Order. In 1990, the USSR was failing and Eastern Europe breaking away from Russia, with East Germany ready to merge with West Germany. “Brent Scowcroft became the model for future national security advisors” (p. 45). James Baker headed the State Department. One key was balancing long-term strategies and operational challenges. Solidarity swept elections in Poland, with Gorbachev letting them do what they wanted, then the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty of 1991. The diplomatic strategy was to provide technical and economic support without provoking Russia.

Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait and occupied the country in two days. President Bush lobbied for allies and attacked with Operation Desert Shield under Colin Powell and field commander Noman Schwarzkopf. The victory boosted Arab moderates. [For some reason they let Saddam stay in power.] Gorbachev resigned and the Soviet Union ceased to exist. [Then we had to learn the names of new countries, all of which had unique problems like Uzbekistan and Armenia.] The US established embassies and humanitarian assistance, plus secured nuclear weapons. Then Yugoslavia splintered after Tito died. With Bush: “The end of the Cold War, a united Germany in NATO, peace in Central America, Desert Storm, and the first negotiations between Israel and all its Arab neighbors” (p. 79).

New transnational problems were environmental destruction, drugs, AIDS and other diseases.

Chapter 3: Yeltsin’s Russia: The Limits of Agency. “If you wanted to understand the grievances, mistrust, and smoldering aggressiveness of Putin’s Russia, you first had to appreciate the sense of humiliation, wounded pride, and disorder that that was often inescapable in Yeltsin’s” (p. 83). Burns considered Russia the most interesting place for diplomacy, so became minister-counselor in Moscow, entering a new embassy filled with listening and monitoring equipment: “Our lady of immaculate reception.” “There is no playbook or operating manual in the Foreign Service, and the absence of diplomatic doctrine, or even systematic case studies, has been a long-standing weakness of the State Department” (p. 86). Embassy staff included positions from Defense, Treasury, Commerce, Agriculture, and sundry intelligence folk.

“Our job was to provide ground truths, a granular sense of political and economic realities in Russia, so that policymakers in Washington could weight them against all the other considerations overflowing their inboxes. We roamed widely across Russia’s eleven time zones, trying to convey to Washington as clear an understanding as we could of the unfolding drama of a Russia struggling to absorb simultaneously three immense historical transformations: the collapse of Communism and the tumultuous transition to market economics and democracy; the collapse of the Soviet bloc and the security it had provided to historically insecure Russians, and the collapse of the Soviet Union itself” (p. 88).

By 1994, Boris Yeltsin was showing his limitations. He started with an open political and economic system and the rush to reform. Hardship hit as industrial production fell and inflation rose, and the public health system collapsed. A voucher system to turn state-owned companies private went to ruthless oligarchs. Plus, a Chechen crisis. Yeltsin turned to drink plus the use of force. The G-8 was created to strengthen the floundering Russia. Plus, large oil and gas reserves.

Presidential visits were complex, with hundreds of staff and journalists, with continuing coordination of schedules. The breakup of Yugoslavia saw Serbia attack neighbors, especially Bosnian Muslims. Richard Holbrooke tried peacemaking (“The ego has landed”). Tony Lake proposed encouraging former Communist countries like Poland to turn democratic with market economies and NATO memberships. The Pentagon had the “Partnership for Peace” for former Warsaw Pact countries, even Russia (which declined). George Kennan opposed this NATO expansion.

Chapter 4: Jordan’s Moment of Transition: The Power of Partnership.

Madelaine Albright replaced Warren Christopher as Secretary of State, described as adept at managing hard issues and complicated personalities. Burns led the transition effort, of what was a “friendly takeover.” Cables to the secretary could be insightful with policy prescriptions, or long-winded and self-absorbed. 

Burns returned to Jordan as ambassador. King Hussein was the region’s longest-serving head of state, handling Middle East turbulence, including water scarcity and high unemployment. Jordan joined the World Trade Organization in 2000. In 1998 he suffered from cancer.

Clinton and King Abdullah signed a free trade agreement in 2000, and Jordan’s exports went from $9 million to over $1 billion by 2004. Assistance levels also increased. Abdullah proved to have even greater finesse at politics than Hussein. Clinton got PLO leader Arafat and Israeli President Barak to meet at Camp David, without an agreement.

Bush (W) became the new president in 2000. [As Texas governor he proved to be an arrogant no-nothing with little interest in understanding complex issues.] Colin Powell became secretary of state.

Chapter 5: Age of Terror: The Inversion of Force and Diplomacy. In 2005 Burns met Muammar al-Qaddafi in Libya, the dictator with the weird repressive system. Burn’s point was that diplomacy can work to change behavior. The Middle East was “the land of bad policy options” (p. 149). The State Department had embassies in 16 Mid-Eastern countries, with particular focus on Israel versus Palestine and the cross-over to Egypt and other states. “Bashar in Damascus offered a glimpse at the banality of evil. … His capacity for mendacity and brutality would remain the cold heart of its survival strategy” (p. 155). Diplomacy resulted in Qaddafi abandoning terrorism and WMD. “What diplomacy is all about—not perfect solutions, but outcomes that cost far less than war and leave everyone better off than they would otherwise have been” (p. 195).

Then September 11, 2001. [Unfortunately, nepo baby Bush was the unprepared, arrogant no-nothing president.] Muslim terror was widespread around the world, but the US had a big military and pushed by Cheney as VP wanted to use it almost exclusively. The first action seemed reasonable, with CIA and US military support of Afghan opposition to overthrow the Taliban but not stop al-Qaida. A new Afghan government was put in place, presumably a democracy in a corrupt, incompetent undeveloped state. The new president was incompetent, corrupt and a bad fit. The Northern Alliance soon morphed into the Taliban. Basically, good options probably were not on the table. Then, Bush shifted focus away from Afghanistan.

For not good reason, Bush then focused on Iraq and getting rid of Saddam. “The road to war in Iraq was distinctive for its intensity and indiscipline” (p. 161). The rationale was bogus, but the US invaded anyway, easily ousting that regime, a massive foreign policy blunder according to Burns. Mubarak and others pointed out the complexity of Iraq society and the total misread by the Bush team, including the corrupt Ahmed Chalabi put in power. Then Bush included Iran as part of the “Axis of Evil,” along with Iraq and North Korea. So much for diplomacy: let’s make Iran an enemy. “The war party within the administration was trying to connect the dots which were unconnectable” (p. 165). The combination of looting and lawlessness in Iraq was a first result.

Jerry Bremer, a retired diplomat, was picked to run Iraq. The military was dismissed, along with the bureaucracy (Baath Party members were fired). They became unemployed and militant against the American presence, along with the Sunni-Shia tensions. The result was a failed state, two if you include Afghanistan. Diplomacy was a second thought at best, after a war that the US did not need to fight. “The Bremer-led Coalition Provisional Authority was a curious amalgam of American hubris, ingenuity, courage, and wishful thinking” (p. 176). Then there was incompetence and torture at Abu Ghraib. It was two bureaucracies with VP Cheney, NSC, and the Defense Department versus the State Department and CIA.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict continued, with terrorist attacks and little diplomacy between PLO leader Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Sharon. Suicide attacks increased. Mahmoud Abbas became prime minister of the Palestinian Authority, with a generally risk-averse perspective. The US was not interested in peacemaking. Despite the demonstrated incompetence, Bush was reelected in 2004 against a “swift-boated” John Kerry. [Arguably, he had little charisma.]

Lebanon became another spot for disfunction with the assassination of prime minister Rafik Harari in 2005.

Chapter 6: Putin’s Disruptions: Managing Great Power Trainwrecks. Burns as the new Ambassador to Russia and Secretary of State Condi Rice met with Putin in 2005, which meant waiting then traveling to his compound, rather than the Kremlin and Putin continued to be annoying. Russia was doing okay as oil prices were near historic highs. “Often as preoccupied with their sense of exceptionalism as Americans were, they sought a distinctive political and economic system. … Putin’s most striking characteristic was his passion for control—founded on an abiding distrust of most of those around him. … Economic progress fueled Putin’s popularity. … He tamed the oligarchs by brokering an implicit deal—if they stayed out of his business, he’d stay out of theirs” (p. 202). Those that didn’t were sent to prison or exiled.  

“Russia had more than its share of vulnerabilities and blind spots, from demographic decline, to worsening corruption, to seething troubles in the North Caucasus. He was not inclined to use Russia’s moment of oil-driven prosperity to diversify and unleash Russia’s human capital. The risk to political order and control was too great” (p. 210). There was little trade with Russia, but Russia wanted to join the World Trade Organization. WTO would improve rule of law and economic progress. Burns wanted contacts to understand various views. Putin meant swagger. Economic growth was 7%, but Putin and his cronies monopolized major sources of wealth. Energy infrastructure was decaying from underinvestment.

The US favored Kosovo independence from Serbia. Then the question of NATO for Ukraine and Georgia. All were opposed by Putin but favored by the State Department. Burns was promoted to undersecretary for political affairs. The US was overconfident in a unipolar world. Burns claimed Putin played strongly with weak cards.

Chapter 7: Obama’s Long Game: Bets, Pivots, and Resets in a Post-Primacy World. Obama won the Presidency in 2008. The major concerns were the Great Recession after the sub-prime debacle and passing Obamacare.

 During his two terms Hillary Clinton and John Kerry would become secretaries of state. They opposed Bush’s “war footing” after 9-11. Clinton got “massive briefing books in the best State Department tradition that anything worth doing is worth overdoing” (p. 249). Obama had a large NSC staff of 300, probably resulting in over deliberation of decisions, “a substitute for action, or a dodge” (p. 252). Then relying on drones and special operations, but they did kill Osama bin Laden.

Clinton appointed him deputy secretary, usually a political appointment. Susan Rice was ambassador to the UN. Diplomacy was revitalized to manage changing relationships with India, China, and Russia. Modi was elected prime minister of India in 2014, which favored Hindus. With China a growing power, there was an effort to promote the Trans-Pacific Partnership.

Qaddafi was overthrown in 2011. The Arab Spring also started in 2011.

Russia joined the World Trade Organization, but relations with the US did not improve. Russia gave asylum to Edward Snowden who leaked massive amounts of classified information. Then Ukrainian president Yanukovich, corrupt and favoring Russia, fled. Putin annexed Crimea and began military operations. The US responded with sanctions.

Chapter 8: The Arab Spring: When the Short Game Intercedes. A Tunisian street merchant who lost his stall to the police and set himself on fire was the beginning. People rioted and the president soon fled. The Arab Spring included riots in Egypt and President Mubarak who had done little to improve economic growth and showed little willingness to start an orderly transition. Corruption was widespread and only the privileged succeeded. The Military dominated, in part based on military aid from the US. The military told Mubarak to step down and in elections the Muslim Brotherhood took over as an anti-American group, electing Mohamed Morsi. It was a disaster, and the military took over under General el-Sisi, arresting Morsi.

Qaddafi was ousted and killed in a civil war, and the country fell into multiple militant groups. Libya’s oil provided a financial cushion.

Diplomats want a “strategy—a set of assumptions about the world they seek to navigate, clear purpose, and priorities” (p. 295), but events can change the focus. Obama wanted to extricate the US from the problem areas of the Middle East, without much luck. Then Ambassador Chris Stevens was killed in Benghazi.

Obama mishandled Syria, setting “red lines” on chemical weapons that Assad violated (using sarin gas), without a harsh response. Assad interpreted this as weakness. It would take another decade for him to be defeated by rebellion. Afghanistan was another problem with the Taliban increasing their power. Iran saw the rise of ISIS. “We regularly paired maximalist ends with minimalist means. More modest objectives and more concentrated means would have been a more coherent combination” (p. 335).

Chapter 9: Iran and the Bomb: The Secret Talks. There was no diplomatic talk with Iran for 35 years and Iran’s nuclear program was accelerating. Obama wanted to wind down US wars in the Middle east and focus on diplomacy. A computer worm sabotaged the program temporarily. A relatively moderate Hassan Rouhani was elected president in 2013. The US offered sanction relief and unfreezing Iranian oil revenue. An agreement was reached by freezing the nuclear program for 6 months with monitoring and a final agreement (JCPOA) reached in 2015. However, a Congressional vote of 2/3rds was impossible. Trump canceled the JCPOA in 2018.

Chapter 10: Pivotal Power: Restoring America’s Tool of First Resort. Burns retired in 2014, in the middle of Obama’s second term. Diplomacy was devalued by Bush after 9/11. Obama tried to focus on diplomacy with mixed success. That collapsed under Trump in 2017, returning great power rivalry with complex risks and trade-offs. China, Russia, and the Middle East had complex dynamics. Technology with machine learning, AI, propaganda bots, and more moved fast. There was Wikileaks. Leaders could communicate directly with less need for embassies and diplomats.

A swollen NSC staff led to over centralization and micromanagement. Trump made things worse, wanting to disrupt rather than adapt and focus on the “America First” slogan in both nasty and mindless ways: “incivility, division, and dysfunction … insulting allies and indulging autocrats. … Trump’s view of diplomacy was narcissistic, not institutional” (p. 398). Rex Tillerson as Secretary of State used an insular and imperious style that made things worse.

“Tocqueville wrote: ‘The greatness of America lies not in being more enlightened that any other nation, but rather in her ability to repair her faults” (p. 400). Burns referred back to George Kennan’s containment doctrine as a “commitment to invest in the resilience of the community of democratic, market-based states … and a cold-eyed recognition of the weaknesses that would eventually unravel the Soviet Union” (p. 401).

Burns goes into the threats facing the US, beginning with China as a developing economic powerhouse under autocratic rule, a thuggish Russia, and an opportunistic Iran, wanting to cause trouble but with domestic discontent and a weak economy. Trump has contempt for Africa and Latin America. “From Joe McCarthy to Donald Trump, American demagogues have doubted the loyalty and relevance of career diplomats, seeking to intimidate and marginalize them. … Members of Congress do not see advocacy for diplomacy as a political asset” (p. 409). Defense and CIA will “troll the corridors of Congress.”

“Diplomacy is most often about quiet power, the largely invisible work of tending alliances, twisting arms, tempering disputes, and making long-term investments in relationships and societies. … Crises averted are less captivating than military victories; the lower costs to consumers that come from trade agreements are less tangible. … Diplomats are classic organizers. … Durable agreements are rooted in mutual self-interest” (p. 406).

Afterword. “We fumbled our post-Cold War unipolar moment. … Our optimism about globalization blinded us to the dislocations that were building alongside … Managing great power competition is what diplomacy is all about.” (p. 429).